While some of these clashes had a political dimension, most were spontaneous incidents triggered essentially by indiscipline and hot-headedness among revolutionary brigades. However, militias from Zintan and Misrata also used their presence in the capital to search for people they suspected of having participated in wartime atrocities, leading to cases of torture, disappearances and killings (Amnesty International, 2012). Outside Tripoli, serious conflicts developed between armed local actors. Between November 2011 and March 2012, heavy fighting erupted in several regions, including between Warshefana and Zawiya militias, between Mashashiya and Zintan, between Asabea and Gharyan, between Tobu and Zuwayya militias in Kufra, and between a revolutionary brigade and the tribal establishment in Bani Walid.
Among the most common triggers for such conflicts were attempts by one group to arrest or disarm members of another community. Many of these conflicts were therefore directly related to the NTC’s slowness in advancing transitional justice. Another common feature was attempts by one party to label their associates as “Gaddafi loyalists,” which often occurred when the conflict involved tribal constituencies that had played a key role in the former regime’s security apparatus. Since both tribes had dominated Gaddafi’s security apparatus, many of their members had been captured by revolutionary forces. In sum, the civil war had laid the groundwork for new conflicts that the NTC was unable to contain.
According to the NTC’s Constitutional Declaration of August 2011, which lays out the timetable for the transition, elections to a General Assembly are to take place within eight months of Libya’s declaration of liberation, i.e. by 23 June 2012. The assembly is to appoint a provisional government and a constituent committee, which will have four months to produce a draft constitution, according to an amended timeframe adopted in March 2012. New elections are to be held seven months after the constitution has been adopted by referendum. There is much to suggest that local actors will continue to play a key role during the transition and will be reluctant to relinquish their newly acquired power to the central government (Hüsken, 2012).
Many revolutionary brigades refuse to hand in their weapons before national institutions can provide security and a fully legitimate government has taken office. But even once these conditions have been met, some cities or tribes – or individual players in local power centres – could maintain their militias, in order to exert political influence when needed. The transitional process could also provide opportunities for local actors to transform their military weight into political power.
As of March 2012, nationwide political forces are only beginning to organise. Even the various Islamist currents, which have the greatest potential to emerge as national forces, have yet to develop into well-defined parties; the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood co-founded a party in early March. However, the transformation of Libya’s political landscape has only just begun. The weak central government is less likely than newly emerging national political forces to challenge local actors’ power. To date, the parties to local conflicts have not attempted to form regional or national coalitions. Interests and patterns of mobilization rooted in the local level are likely to prevent Libya from descending into another civil war.
Some of the results of the revolution include:
- Gaddafi’s government was toppled
- The NTC assumed power
- Factional violence leading to another civil war in 2014
It is reported by Wikipedia that about 9400 deaths, 4000 missing, and about 50000 injured were recorded in the Libyan revolution of 2011.
